Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions by Rasmusen, Eric B. & Posner, Richard A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2000
Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions
Eric B. Rasmusen
Richard A. Posner
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric B. Rasmusen & Richard A. Posner, "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions" ( John M. Olin Program
in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 96, 2000).
Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions
RICHARD A. POSNER
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 219 South Dearborn Street,
Chicago, Illinois, 60624 USA
E-mail: richard_posner@ca7.uscourts.gov.
and
ERIC B. RASMUSEN
Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Rm. 456, 1309 E. 10th Street,
Bloomington, Indiana 47405-1701, USA
E-mail: Erasmuse@Indiana.edu
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are
created or modified. The sanctions for the violation of a norm can be categorized as
automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral costly, and multilateral costly. The
choice of sanction is related to problems in creating and modifying norms. We use our
analysis of the creation, modification, and enforcement of norms to analyze the scope
of feasible government action either to promote desirable norms or to repress unde-
sirable ones. We conclude that the difficulty of predicting the effect of such action limits
its feasible scope. © 1999 by Elsevier Science Inc.
I. Introduction
A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation
or enforcement. Examples range from table manners and the rules of grammar to
country club regulations and standard business practice. Norms may be independent of
laws, as in the examples just given, or may overlap them; there are norms against
stealing and lying, but also laws against these behaviors. The two kinds of rule reinforce
each other through differences in the mode of creation, the definition of the offense,
the procedure for administering punishment, and the punishments themselves. Laws
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are promulgated by public institutions, such as legislatures, regulatory agencies, and
courts, after well-defined deliberative procedures, and are enforced by the police power
of the state, which ultimately means by threat of violence. Norms are not necessarily
promulgated at all. If they are, it is not by the state. Often a norm will result from (and
crystallize) the gradual emergence of a consensus. Norms are enforced by internalized
values, by refusals to interact with the offender, by disapproval of his actions, and
sometimes by private violence.
Norms are an attractive method of social control because a rule may be desirable but
too costly a project for the state to undertake relative to the benefits. A rule against poor
table manners, for example, is hardly suitable for embodiment in law. At the same time,
norms have a number of drawbacks relative to laws. A norm is even more of a public
good than a law, because no one person or political party can claim credit for creating
a norm. Also, the cost of inflicting penalties for violating a norm cannot be financed by
mandatory taxation, and so must be shouldered voluntarily by those who enforce the
norm. Because of these features of norms, it may seem obvious that norms would be
undercreated and underenforced from a social standpoint. Yet we shall see that the
underprovision thesis requires qualification. Norms, like laws, can be bad, so that the
obstacles to their creation and enforcement may actually promote the social welfare. A
related but subtler point is that because norms, once created, are difficult to uncreate,
the stock of norms may be large even though the flow is small.
The focus of the literature on norms has been on their importance and on their
efficiency or inefficiency.1 Another theme has been their neglect by economists.2 We
focus instead on how norms operate and so on the variety of sanctions that enforce
norms, the degree of underenforcement associated with each type of sanction, and the
difficulty of creating norms enforced by each type of sanction.
The sanctions are various:
1The literature is large and growing. One branch examines business dealings. The seminal article, sociological
rather than economic in emphasis, is Stewart Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in Business,” 28 American Socio-
logical Review 55 (1963), and illustrative recent contributions are Lisa Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115 (1992), and Robert D. Cooter,
“Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,” 144
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643 (1996). Another branch, which develops an economic theory of social
custom, begins with two articles by George Akerlof: “The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful
Tales,” 90 Quarterly Journal of Economics 599 (1976), and “A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be
One Consequence,” 94 Quarterly Journal of Economics 749 (1980). A useful survey of theoretical and experimental work
on the role of norms in solving collective-action problems is Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational-
Choice Theory of Collective Action,” 92 American Political Science Review 1 (1998). Much recent work focuses on the
relation between private norms and public laws. See, for example, Robert Cooter, “Models of Morality in Law and
Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the ‘Bad Man’ of Holmes,” 78 Boston University Law Review 903
(1998); Robert Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991); Avery Katz, “Taking Private Ordering
Seriously,” 144 University Pennsylvania Law Review 1745 (1996); Eric A. Posner, “The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,” 63 University of Chicago Law Review 133, 155–161
(1996); Eric A. Posner, “Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,” 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1697 (1996);
J. Mark Ramseyer, “Learning to Love Japan: Social Norms and Market Incentives,” 34 San Diego Law Review 263 (1994);
“Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law,” 27 Journal of Legal Studies (1998).
2This is an old story: Thomas Macaulay and James Fitzjames Stephen attacked James and John Stuart Mill,
respectively, for overemphasizing laws relative to norms as explanations for differences in culture and behavior.
Thomas Macaulay, “Mill on Government,” Edinburgh Review (March 1829) and “Westminster Reviewer’s Defense of
Mill,” Edinburgh Review (June 1829); James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, chapters 1 and 4 (1874). John
Stuart Mill, however, does emphasize the tyranny of public opinion, thus tacitly recognizing the importance of informal
norms in shaping behavior. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859).
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1. Automatic sanctions. The violator’s action carries its own penalty because of its not
being coordinated with the actions of others. Someone who drives on the wrong
side of the road crashes into another car.
2. Guilt. The violator feels bad about his violation as a result of his education and
upbringing, quite apart from external consequences. Probably most people in our
society, though certainly not all, would feel at least somewhat guilty about stealing
even if they believed they were certain not to be caught.
3. Shame. The violator feels that his action has lowered himself either in his own eyes
or in the eyes of other people. In its most common form, shame arises when other
people find out about the violation and think badly of the violator. The violator may
also feel ashamed, however, even if others do not discover the violation. He can
imagine what they would think if they did discover it, a moral sentiment that can
operate even if he knows they never will discover it. Also, he may feel lowered in his
own eyes, a “multiple self” situation in which the individual is both the actor and the
observer of his actions.3
Because the focus is on the violator’s status rather than on the violation, there can
be shame even if there is no element of wrongdoing, no breach of a moral code; so
one can be ashamed of doing something stupid that harms nobody, because
behaving stupidly is failing to live up to one’s self-image. This type of shame shades
off into simple embarrassment.
One can also be shamed (though the better word here would be “humiliated”)
for conduct that violates a moral code not one’s own, where there is no question of
guilt. During the Cultural Revolution in China, people paraded through the streets
in dunce caps felt humiliated even if they disapproved of the regime and therefore
felt no guilt at violating its norms.
For simplicity, we shall treat humiliation as a form of shame, and shame itself as
(1) a purely external sanction for (2) violations of the moral code. It is important
to note, however, that even when viewed purely as an external sanction, that is, as
the product of the actions or reactions of other people, shame (like guilt) is felt
even if other people take no action. If a professor’s arrest for patronizing a
prostitute is publicized, he feels ashamed before his colleagues even though none
of them mentions the arrest to him, perhaps because none of them mentions
it—their silence, which is a reaction to the shameful act, is evidence that the act was
indeed shameful and cannot just be laughed off.
Neither guilt nor shame fits comfortably into the implicit psychological assump-
tions of the rational-choice model of human behavior. We treat them as brute facts,
like food preferences, which constrain rather than explain economic theories of
behavior.
4. Informational sanctions. The violator’s action conveys information about himself that
he would rather others not know. A student wears casual clothing to a job interview,
unintentionally signaling that he does not really care much about getting the job.
5. Bilateral costly sanctions. The violator is punished by the actions of and at the expense
of just one other person, whose identity is specified by the norm. The expense to
that person could be the effort needed to cause the violator disutility, or the utility
that the person imposing the punishment loses by punishing him. Examples of what
3On multiple-self analysis, see, for example, Richard A. Posner, “Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications
for Law and Public Policy,” 3 Legal Theory 23 (1997).
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we are calling bilateral costly sanctions are where an adulterer is shot by a jealous
husband and where the husband divorces his wife after discovering her adultery.
6. Multilateral costly sanctions. The violator is punished by the actions and at the
expense of many other people. A divorced man finds that he is no longer invited to
dinner in the community.4
A norm can be enforced by more than one sanction—indeed, by all six. A drunk
driver weaves along the road and crashes into a bus, killing a child. He has wrecked his
car, he feels guilty, he knows that all his neighbors look down on him, his employer
discovers that he is an alcoholic, the child’s parents condemn him, and he is ostracized
by the entire community.
All six sanctions have analogies in rewards for adherence to norms or for actions
beyond the call of duty. A reward can take the form of a feeling of a duty well done,
material gratitude from one or more people, the automatic gain from coordinated
interaction with someone else, the signaling of desirable qualities, or the good opinion
of others.
We shall consider the sanctions one by one, but it may be useful at the outset to
mention some general properties of optimal nonlegal sanctions. A sanction should
be of the appropriate magnitude; if it is too severe, people will be overdeterred and
refrain from efficient actions. A sanction should not be too costly; the cost will
depend largely on how often it has to be administered, that is, on the frequency of
violation of the norm. Because of the informality of enforcement, it is important
that the application of a sanction not require too much information. If punishment
will not be effective unless many people learn about the violation, there may be no
punishment at all.
II. Sanctions for Violating Norms
Automatic Sanctions
The classic example of an automatically enforced, or self-enforcing, norm is the
convention of driving on the right side of the road. By violating the norm one
increases the chances of an accident to oneself as well as to other people. Norms
often are self-enforcing in the sense that the violator is punished automatically
without the deliberate intervention of anyone. But the punishment may not be
adequate— even in the case of driving on the right— because the violator considers
the cost only to himself and not to other people. Drunk drivers sometimes drive on
the wrong side of the road, even though they know they may hurt themselves, in part
because they neglect the cost to other people. Coordination norms may also be
suboptimal rules that are difficult to change, such as the way “though” is spelled in
English. This, however, is a problem in altering rather than enforcing norms, so we
defer it for now.
4Our categories of guilt and shame correspond to “first-party” sanctions in Ellickson’s terminology; our bilateral
costly to his “second party”; and our multilateral costly to his “third party.” Ellickson, note 1 above, at 130–131. He does
not include what we are calling the automatic and the informational sanctions in his taxonomy because they are not
methods of enforcing norms as he defines “norm.” For other discussion of definitional issues (which we will largely
duck), see Richard McAdams, “The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,” 96 Michigan Law Review 338
(1997).
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Guilt
Guilt is an internal sanction, and so does not depend on the dissemination of infor-
mation. It might be thought a type of automatic sanction, because the violator perceives
it as a cost to himself, like the risk of being injured if he drives on the wrong side of the
road. It differs from a simple automatic sanction, however, in requiring investment to
create it. People must choose a level of effort to instill the potential for feeling guilt into
other people (sometimes even themselves), as well as the amount of guilt to instill. This
illustrates our earlier point that economics can “use” the concept of guilt even if it
cannot explain it.
The sense of guilt may be innate, but it is also developed by formal schooling,
purposive moral influence by parents and relatives, and, possibly most important, the
examples offered by both adults and peers. Parents have an interest, both selfish and
altruistic, in instilling a certain amount of guilt in their children. (So they may instill too
much guilt, from the standpoint of the child’s long-run self-interest, for offenses such as
rudeness, or ingratitude, to one’s elders.) A child who has a sense of guilt is more likely
to conform to norms, and other people’s knowledge of this will help him later in life by
making him a more reliable transacting partner. Rational parents will choose, and
employ the level of effort required to achieve, the degree of strength of the guilt
sanction that will allow for efficient breach of the norm, because often it is advantageous
to violate a norm, especially if others are adhering to it. Rational parents will also
endeavor to maintain marginal deterrence and so refrain from trying to make a child
feel as guilty about not brushing his teeth as about shoplifting.
That a sense of guilt should be to the child’s long-run advantage illustrates one of the
central insights of game theory—that reducing the potential payoffs that a player
obtains in certain contingencies can increase his equilibrium payoff by inducing other
people to alter their behavior. This point is illustrated in Figure 1, which models the
parental decision as to whether to instill guilt about wrongdoing in their daughter.
When the daughter grows up, an employer will decide whether or not to hire her, and
if she is hired she will decide whether or not to steal from the employer. Assume that
the dollar value of the job to the daughter is 40, the benefit to the employer from the
FIG. 1. Optimal guilt.
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daughter’s work is 50, the dollar value of both the gain to the daughter and the loss to
the employer from theft is 30, and the theft cannot be detected. The daughter’s net
pecuniary gain from being hired and committing theft is then 70 (40 1 30), and the
employer’s payoff from hiring the daughter is 220 (50 2 40 2 30). The daughter
suffers guilt pangs that subtract G from her utility if she steals—provided her parents
had instilled guilt in her. The parents and daughter are further assumed to have the
same interests, and the employer can observe (perhaps from the daughter’s school
record, references, and personal deportment) whether the parents have instilled a
sense of guilt in her. The equilibrium depends on the size of the guilt cost, G. If G ,
30, then the parents have no incentive to instill guilt, because whether they do so or not
their daughter would steal if hired because the payoff to her from stealing, 70 2 G,
would exceed 40. Knowing this, the employer will not hire her. If G . 30, however, the
parents would instill guilt in their daughter; she would refrain from stealing if hired;
and so the employer would hire her because her payoff from honest working, 40, would
exceed her gain from dishonest working and the employer would derive a net benefit
from hiring of 10 (50 2 40).
The daughter thus benefits from her parents’ creation of guilt feelings (conscience)
in her, assuming that the job with this employer is her best job opportunity. She obtains
the job by having the potential to feel guilty, but she does not suffer any actual pangs
of guilt because she is honest. By having reduced the payoff to their daughter from
stealing on the job, the parents have benefited her because of the reaction of the third
party, the employer, to their action.
Shame
When viewed as a purely external sanction, shame requires information but is not an
informational sanction (our fourth category), because it can arise even if the violation
does not convey any new information about the character of the violator. Often,
however, what we call shame is partly an informational sanction: the man caught drunk
driving is revealing that he probably drinks heavily on a regular basis, and it is his
consciousness of people’s reaction to the revelation that engenders the feeling of shame
in him. This can be true even of purely internal shame; someone titillated by his first
sight of sexually deviant pornography may be ashamed to discover inclinations within
himself that he never suspected he had.
Shame is often a byproduct of bilateral or multilateral sanctions. When people
criticize a norm violator they are trying to impose a multilateral sanction, but the
disutility of the criticisms to the violator, and thus the efficacy of the sanction, may
be due entirely to shame. If the violator shrugs off the criticisms as a product of
ignorance, malice, or envy, and in addition anticipates no bad effects on him from
the reception of the criticisms by other people, the criticisms will fail as sanctions for
the criticized act.
Shame, like guilt, is a product, in part at least, of education, both formal and
informal. Parents may have a greater incentive to instill shame in their children than
guilt. The optimal strategy from the child’s selfish (which may be the parents’ altruistic)
viewpoint is to violate norms but not get caught, and shame, to the extent that it is an
external sanction and thus depends on information, provides the right incentives for
that.
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Informational Sanctions
If the violation of a norm is positively correlated with the possession of undesirable
characteristics, people will be likely to punish the violator.5 The undesirable personal
characteristic could be a tendency to violate the particular norm—as when a man beats
a woman and is punished by not being able to find any other woman willing to associate
with him—or to violate norms generally. The sanction is efficient. Not only does it
impose significant costs on the violator; its cost to the enforcer is actually negative,
because he averts a loss by avoiding dealings with a person who by his violation has
revealed himself to be an unreliable transactional partner.
The personal (or commercial) characteristic revealed by the violation may be only
distantly related to the violation yet convey valuable information, as when a person
arrested for assault is believed to be less likely to work hard for whoever employs him.
Consider the following game:
1. Nature chooses 90% of workers to be “steady,” with productivity p 5 x, and 10% to
be “wild,” with productivity p 5 x 2 y.
2. A worker decides whether to marry or not. Marriage adds utility u 5 m for a steady
worker and utility u 5 2z for a wild worker.
3. The employer, observing whether the worker is married but not whether he is wild,
offers him a wage wm or wu in competition with other employers, depending on
whether he is married or not. The employer has no intrinsic reason to care whether
the worker is married. Wild workers are less productive, but whether they are
married has no effect on their productivity. The only significance of marriage for
the employer is its informational value as a signal of steadiness.
4. The payoffs received are pw for the employer if he succeeds in hiring the worker, wu
for a married employed worker, w for an unmarried employed worker, u for a
married unemployed worker, and 0 for an employer who does not hire and for an
unmarried worker who is not hired.
What will the equilibrium be? Unlike in many signaling models,6 here there is only a
single equilibrium. If z is large enough (namely, greater than y), the employer will pay
wages of wu 5 x 2 y and wm 5 x, the steady worker will get married, and the wild worker
will stay single.7
The employer in this example might be “unthinkingly” obeying a norm of paying
married workers more. Businessmen, like private individuals, follow many norms with-
out inquiring into their rationality. In the example, following the norm is efficient even
if no businessman understands its origin or rationale. And notice that unmarried
workers will not marry to fool the employer into paying them a higher wage because, by
5See, for example, Eric A. Posner, “Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law,” 27 Journal of Legal
Studies 765 (1998); Eric Rasmusen, “Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality,” 39 Journal of Law and
Economics 519 (1996).
6See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information, ch. 10 (2nd ed., 1994), and next footnote.
7The analysis is more complicated, however, if z , y. For example, if z , 0.9y, wild workers will all get married and
pretend to be steady. The employer will offer wages of wu 5 x 2 y and wm 5 0.9x 1 0.1 (x 2 y), but no one will be
paid the wage for the unmarried. If y . z . 0.9y, wild workers will split in their behavior, in a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. The employer will pay wages of wu 5 x 2 y and wm 5 x 1 y 1 z; the steady worker will get married; the
fraction f 5 0.9(y 2 z)/z of the wild workers will marry; and the employer will earn zero profits when he hires a married
worker—i.e., f solves 0.9x/(0.9 1 0.1f) 1 0.1f (x 2 y)/(0.9 1 0.1f) 2 (x 2 y 1 z) 5 0. A further complication, but
not one that would alter the implications of our analysis, is that efficiency might require that the different types of
worker (steady and wild) be sorted into different types of job (e.g., management and sales).
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definition, these are the workers for whom the wage premium is less than the disutility
(stemming from their “wildness”) of marriage. Notice also in this example that subsi-
dizing marriage not only would not raise productivity, but would lower it, by depriving
employers of useful information about the marginal product of their workers. The same
is true, however, of taxing marriage; obviously, the marriage signal would be destroyed
if marriage were taxed out of existence. And likewise if government forbade employers
to use an applicant’s marital status in making a hiring decision. This is an example of
the danger of government fiddling with norms.
Informational sanctions may seem potentially too severe. A trivial violation of a norm,
if the violation signals the offender’s probable unreliability as a friend or business
acquaintance, may precipitate ostracism that will impose a cost on the violator that
exceeds the social cost of his breach. But this need not be excessive punishment,
because it corrects an asymmetry of information and by doing so confers a social benefit
that is distinct from its deterrent effect.
Bilateral Costly Sanctions
These require only a minimal dissemination of information; the designated punisher is
the only person who needs to learn of the violation. The difficulty lies in getting the
punisher to carry out the punishment, given that it is costly to him, unlike the previous
cases that we have been considering. Providing motivation for the punishment may
require second-order internal norms, or a system of punishing nonpunishers. Corsican
norms of vengeance, for example, supplemented bilateral costly sanctions with multi-
lateral ones by ostracizing anyone who was unwilling to carry out his duty of avenging
an injury.8 Punishment can be facilitated by reducing its costs, as in the preceding
example, where the net cost of punishing, which is the difference between the cost of
punishing and the cost of not punishing, is reduced by imposing a cost on the
nonpunisher. The costs of punishment can also be reduced by releasing the punisher
from the ordinary sanctions, formal or informal, for the punishing behavior and relying
on his vengeful emotions, which may exist even without second-order norms, to create
a perceived benefit of vengeance in excess of the now reduced costs.9 Ordinarily, a
person who has insulted someone in public is sanctioned, but if his insults are punish-
ment for the other person’s norm violation, the insults are excused. Children early
discover the not always credible excuse: “But he started it!”
Multilateral Costly Sanctions
Multilateral punishments require more information than bilateral ones. The free-rider
problem is exacerbated because more people are involved, but ameliorated because
each punisher’s cost of punishment can be less for the same total deterrent. The Amish
practice of shunning offenders against church rules is an example. Like other Menno-
nites, the Amish have norms both against violence and against going to court. Excom-
8Jon Elster, The Cement of Society 127 (1989).
9See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice, ch. 8 (1981); Jack Hirshleifer, “On the Emotions as Guarantors of
Threats and Promises, in The Latest and the Best 307 (John Dupre, ed. 1987); Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason:
The Strategic Role of the Emotions (1988).
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munication, with resulting ostracism, is therefore the maximum punishment.10 But it is
effective because the Amish constitute an isolated subculture from which exit is costly.
Ostracism lies at the end of a spectrum the other end of which is the “dirty look”—an
expression of disapproval with no tangible penalty attached. It is remarkable how
sensitive people are to manifestations of disapproval even by strangers and even when
unaccompanied by any implicit or explicit threat. Of course, this form of the multilat-
eral costly sanction works only when the benefits of violating a norm are slight; but it
does work then, because the cost of this form of sanction to the sanctioner is low.
III. The Creation and Destruction of Norms
A norm is a public good. Although exceptions can be imagined, ordinarily a norm is
nonrivalrous, because its cost does not rise if more people use the norm; and it is
nonexcludable, because people who do not contribute to its enforcement cannot be
denied its benefits. The norm is, therefore, in danger of being underproduced. By the
same token, once a norm is established, it is hard to change, because norm innovation
is also a public good. Creating a norm requires promulgation of the norm and creation
of sanctions for its violation. Eliminating a norm requires promulgation, too, and also
the destruction of the expectations and tastes that support the sanctions for its viola-
tion—a process of taste changing that may be as costly as their creation in the first place.
Changing a norm, which requires elements of both destruction and creation, can be the
most difficult trick of all.
Consider changing a self-enforcing coordination norm, such as a rule of language. If
“goodbye” became an inefficient form of farewell, individuals could shift to “take care”
without cost. Any one person who changed would be able to convey the same meaning
as before, and would not be thought worse of by other people. Many writers are now
shifting from using “he” as the indefinite pronoun to “he or she,” “he/she,” or “she.”
The writer’s meaning is still apparent, as in the case of shifting from “goodbye” to “take
care,” but in the “he/she” case the violation of the grammatical norm distracts the
reader and slows down communication. The rapidity with which the norm has never-
theless changed is a result of the felt value to many people of signaling a belief in
feminist goals. It has not changed all the way, however, because some writers wish to
signal their rejection of what they take to be an extremist feminist ideology.
In both these examples, altering an existing norm is feasible because it can be done
gradually and, hence, without centralized direction. A coordination norm that cannot
be changed gradually would be reversing traffic signals so that red meant “go” and
green meant “stop,” or changing from driving on the right to driving on the left. Such
a norm change would have to be adopted by everyone at once, unlike minor language
changes, to avoid enormous transition costs. The only—but considerable—cost of the
norm changes in our traffic examples lies in the habitual character of compliance with
these norms. Another familiar example is the ordering of keys on a typewriter or
computer keyboard. The keyboard cannot gradually evolve, letter by letter, into a new
10For example, Andrew Yoder, having been ostracized by church orders, sued four church leaders for conspiracy to
deprive him of civil liberties. He won, and upon the defendants’ refusing to pay damages one of the church leader’s
farms was sold by the sheriff. The judgment might well have been reversed on appeal, but the norm against going to
court seems to have prevented the hiring of defense counsel and the filing of an appeal. John Yoder, “Caesar and the
Meidung,” 23 Mennonite Quarterly Review 76 (1949). For a theoretical discussion of costly ostracism in a repeated game,
see David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen, “Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Ostracism,” 12 Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 87 (1989).
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arrangement. In the age of the computer one can remap the keys into different symbols
one by one, so that the capital costs would be slight, but for someone who touchtypes
the disruption from a change in even one key is severe because of habituation to the
existing pattern. If the transitional costs to a new norm are high enough, we have the
phenomenon of a norm “trap,” meaning that society is stuck with a suboptimal norm
because of the costs of changing it.11
Trying to change from one language to another, as opposed to changing usage within
a single language, would present a similar problem on a vaster scale.12 The cost would
be enormous and the benefits highly diffuse, even though they might be enormous also.
National languages do change, but ordinarily it is through an intermediate stage of
bilingualism. What has been more common is reform in writing, as in the simplification
of Chinese characters in the 20th century,13 the replacement of the Gothic alphabet by
the Roman in Germany after World War II,14 and the increasing substitution in Korean
writing of the highly phonetic Korean “alphabetic syllabary” for Chinese characters.15
But in the Chinese and Korean cases, the change was effected by government, just as in
the case of Sweden’s overnight change from driving on the left to driving on the right.16
The problem of transitions (path dependence) is not special to norms, however; it
arises whenever standardization is desirable, as in the typewriter keyboard, railroad
gauges, the size of screws, and the color of traffic signals. But it explains why often it is
desirable that norms should change slowly even when the change is in the direction of
a clearly superior norm. Because the superior norm may take time to phase in, there
may be a rent in the fabric of social control if the older, inferior norm disappeared
before the transition was complete. Consider the gradual decline of vengeance as an
extralegal normative system for deterring and punishing crime. The decline paralleled
the increasing sophistication and efficacy of law’s methods of crime prevention. Had the
vengeance norm collapsed suddenly, anarchy would have resulted because the legal
methods of crime control (involving police, judges, lawyers, and so on) were not yet
highly developed.
Dovetailing the fading and the emerging norm is difficult, however. Rapid change in
the social environment may make norms dysfunctional before enough time has passed
for the normative system to adapt fully. The overdeveloped sense of honor in white
males of the Old South (a residue of a vengeance culture), the similar “macho” values
of poor young black males in our cities today, and the surprisingly resilient “coolness”
of cigarette smoking are all examples of norms that apparently are dysfunctional under
current conditions but that nevertheless persist. Without public intervention, many
norms change only gradually or not at all. (This is our earlier point that the destruction
11The claim that the QWERTY keyboard is inefficient has, however, been greatly undermined by S. Liebowitz and
Stephen Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” 33 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1990). See, also, Nicholas Economides’
networks website at raven.stem.nyu.edu/networks. In any event, no one doubts that the transition costs of adopting a
new keyboard would be considerable.
12See Richard Adelstein, “Language Orders,” 7 Constitutional Political Economy 221 (1996).
13See, for example, Insup Taylor and M. Martin Taylor, Writing and Literacy in Chinese, Korean and Japanese, ch. 8
(1995); Language Reform in China: Documents and Commentary (Peter J. Seybolt and Gregory Kuei-ke Chiang, eds. 1979).
14Kenneth Katzner, The Languages of the World 70–71 (new ed., 1995).
15See Taylor and Taylor, note 13 above, pt. 2. The Korean alphabet, introduced by the government early in the 15th
century, shows that the reform of writing is not a recent invention. Failed attempts to change languages abound.
Consider Ireland’s attempt to expand the use of Gaelic, or Canada’s attempt to spread the use of French. There have
been notable successes, but most have been the result of conquest; an exception is the revival of the dead language
Hebrew as the national language of Israel.
16See “Sweden Tells Traffic to Keep to the Right,” Business Week, Sept. 2, 1967, p. 26.
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as well as the creation of norms is a public good, so that it is possible for the flow of
norms to be too small but the stock of norms too large.) This is only a tendency; Cooter
gives the counterexample of a relatively rapid change in tribal norms in New Guinea
that formerly allowed the “big man” to alienate property, a norm that became dysfunc-
tional once an active land market developed.17
At the opposite extreme, if frequent change is itself a norm, as in women’s fashions,
the impression of frequent and easy norm change is misleading. The surprise would be
if the “change norm” itself changed suddenly—if one year women’s fashions were
identical to the previous year’s. Where faddism is the norm, the rapid succession of fads
indicates norm stability, not instability.
Norms enforced by guilt and shame are particularly difficult to create or to change.
(This is a factor in the resistance of honor cultures to norm change: these cultures rely
heavily on shame to induce norm compliance.) Guilt and shame are heavily influenced
by social conditioning, which is not quickly or easily altered either by individuals or by
governments. Nongovernmental organizations may be more effective than either indi-
viduals or governments in this regard, but it is not clear whether a society that gives
ample scope to norm-changing organizations will have more or less norm creation and
stability. Religious pluralism, for example, has a complex effect on norms. It facilitates
norm shopping, both because a person can find a religion that does not constrain his
activities and because he can find one that constrains them in a way that he finds
desirable. Belonging to a church that punishes deviance can be as useful to one’s
long-term welfare (in quite materialistic terms) as having parents who instill guilt, and
a religious sect in a pluralist society can provide an alternative community to the society
at large, as in the case of the Amish. But although norm competition, which religious
freedom promotes, encourages the creation of norms, it also facilitates their destruc-
tion.
Understanding how norms change aids in understanding how they are created. When
incremental change is feasible, even complex norms can evolve from meager begin-
nings, given enough time. Comparing the scene depicted on Achilles’ shield in Book
XX of the Iliad with modern norms of judicial behavior, one gets a glimpse of how those
norms could, over a period of more than 2,500 years, have evolved from rudimentary
procedures. The shield depicts informal, voluntary arbitration before a lay tribunal.
This is remote from modern litigation (though not so remote from modern arbitra-
tion), yet it is easy to trace a step-by-step evolution from the ancient to the modern
practices of dispute resolution.
Heavy sanctions for violating a norm affect both norm change and who becomes a
norm innovator. Kuran shows how norms that appear to be very strong can suddenly
evaporate, enforced as they are by people’s beliefs that other people will continue to
enforce them.18 Tocqueville wrote that revolutionary crowds are led literally by mad-
men: people who through psychological illness are willing to risk danger and disgrace,
or in other words who are less responsive to sanctions.19
Some norms are easier to create than to enforce. It is relatively easy to create
17Cooter, note 1 above.
18Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (1995).
19Alexis de Tocqueville, Souvenirs 195 (1978 [1850]): “I have always thought that in revolutions and especially in
democratic revolutions, madmen, not those to whom one gives the name metaphorically, but real ones, have played a
very considerable political role. This at least is certain, at least, that a half-crazy false messiah in this time often goes on
to success.”
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coordination norms, because their punishments are automatic, although, as we noted
earlier, such punishments are unlikely to be optimally severe, because the violator will
ignore the costs of the violation to everyone but himself. On the other hand, a norm
that requires multilateral punishment is hard to create in the first place, but once
created it may be cheap to enforce (because little is required of each punisher) and the
problem of cost externalization by the violator will not arise.
The diversity of norms along such dimensions as efficacy, durability, mode of en-
forcement, and conformity to overall social goals limits the scope of useful generaliza-
tion. Such questions as whether the United States has too few or too many norms, or
whether norms are a good thing or a bad thing, or whether they “work” in a society as
heterogeneous and individualistic as that of the United States are either unanswerable
or misconceived. (To see this, substitute “law” for “norms.”) A more particularistic
analysis is required.
IV. Norms, Laws, and Government
Norms are particularly effective devices for social control, relative to law, when individ-
ual violations (though perhaps not aggregate violations) are too trivial, or the difficulty
of proving guilt too great, to justify the expense of trials, police, and prisons. But the
sanctions for violating norms are often too weak to deter all people from many offenses,
while norm creation is too slow to provide for all the rules necessary for the governance
of society—so laws have their place too.
Government can provide supplemental punishments if the informal sanction for
violating a norm is inadequate. It does this for theft, for example. Indeed, it is a
common observation that norms are more important than laws in deterring theft,
although one might question whether the norms would long survive elimination of the
laws. Some norms would—commercial norms arose before they were enforced by
courts. The government can often leave the promulgation of a desired norm to the
private sector while providing sanctions for violations once the norm is established.
Legal sanctions for norm violations are also important because many people are
impervious to informal sanctions. They lack guilt and shame, do not mind ostracism
(because they have no valuable transactional opportunities regardless of their norm
compliance), or have no reputation to lose, but they are still vulnerable to the law’s
tangible sanctions.
An additional role of government in relation to norm enforcement is to provide
information. If multilateral or shame sanctions are to work, the violation must be
publicized. With any nonautomatic sanction except guilt, incorrect information is a
problem. Innocent people may be punished even if they did not really violate the norm.
This is not just a problem for the information sanctions. Mistaken creation of shame is
also possible. A person does not like to be found in a compromising situation even if he
knows himself to be fully innocent and thus does not experience a feeling of guilt.
The legal process is designed to minimize the likelihood of erroneously imposing
formal legal sanctions. Elaborate protections of the innocent are not necessary with
regard to most of the conduct that norms rather than laws regulate, because the
sanctions for violation are not severe. But when the norm violations are punished by
especially severe extralegal sanctions, a public hearing to correct the erroneous impo-
sition of the sanction is warranted. This is the economic rationale for the provision of
legal remedies against defamation. Defamation is an information sanction, discourag-
ing people from dealing with the defamed person. But if the penalty for slander (oral
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defamation, as opposed to written, which is governed by libel law) is too high, people
will be afraid to gossip for fear that they do not have the story exactly right. Gossip is an
important facilitator of sanctions for violating norms.20
A third point (the first, remember, was supplemental punishment, and the second,
information) is that government should be careful about interfering with norm sanc-
tions. Sometimes just staying out of the way is the best policy. If bilateral sanctions such
as shotgun marriages are to work, the law has to relax its monopoly on force.21
Preventing ordinary citizens from carrying concealed weapons may increase violent
crime by hindering the bilateral costly sanction of self-defense.22
Fourth, the government can supply incentives for administering private sanctions for
violating a norm. Consider the enforcement of contracts that provide for arbitration of
disputes arising under them. A contract is a set of norms constructed by two parties. If
the law enforces arbitration awards (as it does), it gives legal backing to private norm
formation and enforcement.
Fifth, the government can foster the creation of norms. In the case of coordination
norms, the government can promulgate the new norm, as in the examples we gave
earlier. When guilt and shame are the sanctions, the government can help to instill
these in children and adults alike. But because moral and intellectual education can
work at cross-purposes, an increase in the resources devoted to education is not a
dependable means of promoting governance by norms. Intellectual education weakens
norms by revealing alternative norms and by providing the tools for the student to use
in creating his or her own moral principles.23 “Liberal” education is “freeing” educa-
tion, and one of those freedoms is from norms. Indeed, if education is more effective
at promoting individualistic thinking than at inculcating norms, the net effect of
education may be to reduce the normative regulation of society. Whether education is
effective at either task is, of course, the despair of teachers at all levels, so it may be that
the net effect is small, whichever effect preponderates. Nevertheless, what appears to be
a long-term movement away from regulation by norms and toward regulation by law
may reflect an inverse relation between a society’s level of education and the efficacy of
regulation by norms. Moreover, education and income are positively correlated; privacy
is a superior good; and privacy reduces the efficacy of norms by depriving neighbors,
acquaintances, gossips, and scandal sheets of the information needed for shame,
informational, and multilateral sanctions.24
Sixth, the government has a role to play in combating bad norms. It can do this by
diminishing the benefits of compliance with such norms by creating effective legal
20See Sally Merry, “Rethinking Gossip and Scandal,” in Toward a General Theory of Social Control, vol. 1, p. 271 (Donald
Black, ed. 1984).
21On the importance of this norm, see George Akerlof, Janet Yellen, and Michael Katz, “An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States,” 111 Quarterly Journal of Economics 277 (1996). They find that the change
in the 1960s in the norms governing births out of wedlock was due to the rise of birth control and abortion, which
reduced the benefits of shotgun marriages. Most such marriages, of course, were not literally enforced by the threat of
violence; nor do we suggest that permitting such threats would be warranted by the costs of out-of-wedlock births,
substantial as those costs are.
22John Lott and David Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence, and the Right to Carry Concealed Handguns,” 26 Journal of
Legal Studies 1 (1997).
23As emphasized in Richard A. Posner, “Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach,” 87 American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 365 (May 1997); see also Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 70–75
(1999).
24See Yuval Tal, Privacy and Social Norms: Social Control by Reputational Costs (unpublished diss., University of Chicago
Law School, 1997).
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remedies for deliberate injuries, which reduces the benefit of a vengeance norm based
on (for example) personal honor. Or it can increase the cost of complying with the
norm, most simply by affixing a legal penalty such as making dueling a crime. But
because the heart of an honor-based vengeance system is a readiness to act without
regard to the balance of costs and benefits, increasing the costs of compliance with a
bad norm is not as simple as it seems. Once a legal penalty is affixed, compliance with
the norm may even more effectively signal the dueler’s honor. However, honor implies
indifference only to certain costs, in much the same way that indigence may make one
indifferent to uncollectable fines, but not to imprisonment. The proper “currency” in
which to punish dueling is to make dueling dishonorable, as by disqualifying the dueler
from the public offices that a man of honor is duty-bound to fill.25
Dueling is too “safe” an example, however, of a bad norm, because no one in our
society approves of dueling. One danger of governmental intervention to promote
“good” norms and crush “bad” ones is that norms are frequently contested, so that
government may find itself taking sides in an unedifying struggle between interest
groups. The Constitution provides a partial barrier to such intervention through its
guaranties of freedom of religious, speech, and association.
Whether government has the capacity to carry out the functions sketched above may
be questioned, in light of the fine tuning required. Most often it may be best for the
government to “keep out of the way” and allow the private regime of norm creation and
enforcement to operate unhindered. But obviously the government cannot be kept out
of the norm business by any feasible constitutional rule; and we emphasize that the
intervention that takes the form of supplementing and regulating rather than supplant-
ing norm sanctions is likely to be less intrusive than many other forms of government
regulation. Norms provide a private, decentralized, and competitive alternative to
governmental control of social behavior.
25Lawrence Lessig, “The Regulation of Social Meaning,” 62 University of Chicago Law Review 943, 971–972 (1995).
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